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THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:
INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC COURT?
Jed Odermatt
*
Abstract
This article discusses how the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU ) deals
with international law issues. While the EU and the Court itself are often presented
as being `friendly' towards international law, recent cases have shown a trend
towards a more guarded approach by the Court. The article first examines recent
literature on the CJEU's relationship with international law which demonstrates
an oscillation between `openness' towards international law and an approach that
emphasises the autonomy of the EU legal order. It then discusses what rules exist
to guide the Court in determining its relationship with international law. To what
extent do the EUTreaties, the legal traditions of theMember States or international
law itself determine how the CJEU should deal with international law issues? The
next part examines how the CJEU has dealt with international law in practice. The
CJEU has progressively developed tools to limit the effect of international law, as it
attempts to strike a balance between respect for international law and the need to
safeguard the integrity of the EU legal order. It discusses some recent cases where
the CJEU dealt with key international law issues in order to demonstrate how this
relationship is shaped in practice. The final part seeks to understandwhy the Court
seems to oscillate between an open and a closed approach to international law. It
is posited that this can partly be explained by whether the Court is acting in its
capacity as an international or a domestic court.
Keywords
Court of Justice of the European Union, International Law, European Law, EU
Legal Order, International Court, Domestic Court, Kadi, Mox Plant, Air Transport
Association of America, Brita, Hungary v Slovak Republic, Diakité
1 Introduction
If the EU perceives of itself as a uniquely internationally engaged
entity, and as a political system founded on the idea of transnational
legal and political cooperation, we would be inclined to expect that
its Court of Justice would reflect something of this internationalist
orientation too.1
*
PhD Candidate, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies/Institute for International Law.
1
G de Búrca, `After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human
Rights Adjudicator?' (2013) 20Maastricht JECL 168, 183.
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De Búrca alludes to a supposed paradox that underlies the EU's relationship
with international law. On the one hand, the EU founding treaties state that the
EU shall contribute to the `strict observance and the development of international
law' and the EU has for decades presented itself as a good global citizen which
seeks to respect international law. On the other hand, recent case law of the Court
of Justice of the EuropeanUnion (CJEU orCourt) has often stressed the autonomy
of the EU legal order, demonstratingwhatmay be considered to be a less `friendly'
attitude towards international law. The purpose of this contribution is to further
understand this apparent paradox.
The first part briefly examines recent literature that has described the CJEU's
relationship with international law. It then discusses what rules exist to guide the
Court in determining its relationship with international law. To what extent do
the EU Treaties, the legal traditions of the Member States or international law
itself determine how the CJEU should deal with international law issues? The
next part examines how the CJEU has dealt with international law in practice.
The CJEU has progressively developed tools to limit the effect of international
law, as it attempts to strike a balance between respect for international law and
the need to safeguard the integrity of the EU legal order. It discusses some
recent cases where the CJEU dealt with key international law issues in order
to demonstrate how this relationship is shaped in practice. The final part tries
to understand why the Court seems to oscillate between an open and a closed
approach to international law. It is posited that this can partly be explained by
whether the Court is acting in its capacity as an international or a domestic court.
1.1 Oscillation between `Open' and `Closed'
There is an ever-expanding literature focusing on the EU's relationship with in-
ternational law. This tells strikingly different stories about the CJEU's attitude.
Whereas some scholars describe the EU legal order and the CJEU as `völkerrechts-
freundlich',2 others view the Court's attitude, particularly since the Kadi3 judg-
ment, as one that is much less open to international law. The dominant view is
that the CJEU is generally open to international law but retains the prerogative to
determine how and under what circumstances international law has an influence
2
E Cannizzaro, `Neo-monism of the European Legal Order', in E Cannizzaro, P Palchetti & R A
Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union (2011) 57.
3
Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat International
Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351.
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in the EU legal order. In a recent book examining the relationship between the
EU and international law the editors summarise the position:
Although openness to international law is the prevalent vision,
whether international law should function in the EU internally de-
pends on the blessing of the Union, which can also be withheld,
should it contradict the EU's policy, objectives, rationale or prin-
ciples.4
Some writers have pointed out that the Court has generally taken an
`international-law-friendly approach',5 asserting that the CJEU's case law is
`particularly friendly towards international law'.6 Kaddous writes that `[i]n recent
years the Court has taken a very open approach to the effects of international
agreements within the EU legal order'.7 Regarding its approach to treaties,
Mendez argues that the CJEU has taken a `maximalist' approach.8 Similarly,
Petersen contrasts the CJEU's approach to international lawwith the `sovereignty
paradigm' of the US Supreme Court, arguing that the CJEU `primarily adopts an
internationalist standpoint'.9 Regarding the reception of international law into
the EU legal order, Martines states that the EU order `appears rather permeable
to international law provisions'.10
Recent scholarly literature, however, has pointed the CJEU's `judicial recalci-
trance'11 towards incorporating international law norms. Klabbers, for example,
4
D Kochenov & F Amtenbrink (eds), The European Union's Shaping of the International Legal Order
(2014) 5.
5
P J Kuijper, `Customary International Law, Decisions of International Organisations and Other
Techniques for Ensuring Respect for International Legal Rules in European Community Law', in
J Wouters, A Nollkaemper & E De Wet (eds), The Europeanisation of International Law (2008) 29.
6
R Uerpmann-Wittzack, `The Constitutional Role of International Law', in A Von Bogdndy & J
Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2
nd
edn, 2010) 138, 143.
7
C Kaddous, `Effects of International Agreements in the EU Legal Order', in M Cremona & B de
Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (2008) 311.
8
M Mendez, `The Legal Effect of Community Agreements: Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and
Judicial Avoidance Techniques' (2010) 21 EJIL 83, 88.
9
N Petersen, `The Reception of International Law by Constitutional Courts through the Prism of
Legitimacy'(2012) 72 ZaöRV 223, 239.
10
F Martines, `Direct Effect of International Agreements of the European Union' (2014) 25 EJIL
129, 135.
11
FCasolari, `Giving Indirect Effect to International Lawwithin the EU Legal Order: TheDoctrine
of Consistent Interpretation', in E Cannizzaro, P Palchetti & R A Wessel (eds), International Law
as Law of the European Union (2011) 395.
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posits that the CJEU `is highly reluctant to give any effect to international law'.12
He challenges the assumption of many scholars that the EU is `friendly' towards
international law:
This position has no doubt contributed to the image of the EU as
an actor that is friendly disposed towards international law, but the
image is deceptive: the EU is friendly disposed towards EU law, and
while itmay have been fashionable to regard EU law as an emanation
of international law, this is no longer habitually done. The fact that
EU law prescribes monism with respect to its own domestic effect is
understandable and has in all likelihood contributed greatly to the
longevity and success of the EU, but is not based on a particularly
friendly attitude towards international law.13
The CJEU's relationship with international law is sometimes discussed in
terms of adopting a monist or dualist approach: `[d]epending on its perspective—
and not on a different standpoint of the observer—the ECJ applies a monistic
doctrine relating to its Member States and a dualistic doctrine relating to inter-
national law, two completely diverging doctrines'.14
It is often stated that the CJEU's approach to international law is a `monist'
one.15 However, as Eckes argues, `[i]n recent landmark cases such as Kadi or
Intertanko, the Court of Justice's approach to international law appears to bemore
``dualist'' in that it restricts the effects of international law within the European
legal order'.16 De Búrca also argued that in Kadi the CJEU adopted `a sharply
dualist tone in its approach to the international legal order and to the relationship
between EC law and international law'.17
The Court's approach to international law, according to the literature,
seems to oscillate between `open' and `closed', `friendly' and `unfriendly'. Both
12
J Klabbers, The European Union in International Law (2012) 77.
13
Ibid, 71.
14
L Kirchmair, `The ``Janus Face'' of the Court of Justice of the European Union: A Theoretical
Appraisal of the EU Legal Order's Relationship with International andMember State Law' (2012)
4 Goettingen JIL 677, 679.
15
K Lenaerts, `Droit International et Monism de l'Ordre Juridique de l'Union' (2010) Revue de la
Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Liège 505.
16
C Eckes, `International Law as Law of the EU: The Role of the ECJ', in E Cannizzaro, P Palchetti
& R A Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union (2011).
17
G de Búrca, `The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi' (2009)
51 Harvard ILJ 1, 2.
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international law and EU law scholars have noted that the CJEU's approach to
international law seems to have shifted over time. It is perhaps an understatement
to say that `[t]he case law of the ECJ on the effect of decisions of international
authority within the EU legal system is not entirely homogenous'.18 What can
explain this? The problemwith terms like `openness' and `friendliness' to describe
the CJEU's approach to international law is that they tend to obscure what is
in fact a much more complex relationship. It may be better to understand it
as multiple relationships. At times, the Court's approach is `closed' or `dualist'
because it is operating as a domestic constitutional court, seeking to find a balance
between respect for international law and the need to safeguard the autonomy of
the EU legal order. In other instances, the EU is muchmore open to international
law because it employs international law as a tool to resolve legal issues, much
more like an international court.
Allain notes that `[f]ew would care to characterise the European Court
of Justice as an international court'.19 This is because, while the CJEU is
an `international' court in the sense that it is established by Member States
by an international treaty, the Court fulfils a role that is much closer to
that of a national/federal constitutional court. In this contribution, the term
`international' or `domestic' are used to describe the role that the Court plays
in a given case, rather than the nature of the Court as such. When it acts
as an international court, the CJEU interprets and applies international law to
resolve disputes. It acts as a domestic (constitutional) court when it determines
how international law can have effect in the EU legal order and the extent to
which international law may be used as a yardstick to judge the validity of
EU acts. It is argued that the Court is much more open to international law
when it fulfils the former role and more guarded when it fulfils the latter. The
purpose of this contribution is to go further than the one-dimensional narrative
of international law friendliness towards developing an understanding of the
multiple relationships that exist. How does the Court's role as an international or
domestic court shape its approach to international law?
18
Petersen, above n 9, 248.
19
J Allain, `The European Court of Justice is an International Court' (1999) 68 Nordic JIL 249.
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2 Developing the CJEU's Approach to International
Law Issues
It is generally accepted that the CJEU is free to determine how it deals with
international law. This is in line with the understanding that on the question of
how domestic legal orders give effect to international legal norms, international
law is agnostic. The constitutional systems of states may require international
law to be transposed into domestic legislation before it is given effect or they
may apply international law directly. Similarly, the CJEU is still in the process of
determining how, and under what conditions, international law should be given
effect within the EU legal order. In determining the contours of this relationship
the CJEU may be guided by the EU Treaties, the legal systems of the Member
States and by international law itself.
2.1 The EU Treaties and International Law
Klabbers notes that `the TEU (nor any of the other relevant foundational
treaties) says nothing whatsoever about the effect of international law within the
``internal'' legal order of the EU'.20 While it is true that the EU Treaties do not
contain specific clauses specifying how international law is to be dealt with, the
Treaties are not entirely silent on the issue of international law and thus can be
used as a starting point for the Court.
The EU Treaties demonstrate a commitment to the respect for international
law and multilateralism. Article 3(5) TEU states that the Union `shall contribute
[…] to the strict observance and the development of international law'. The
Court has interpreted this to mean that `when it adopts an act, it is bound to
observe international law in its entirety, including customary international law'.21
Article 21(1) TEU provides that the Union's `action on the international scene' is
to be guided by numerous principles, including the `respect for the principles of
the United Nations Charter and international law'.22 Respect for international
law is referred to as one of the EU principles that `inspired [the Union's] own
creation'23 on the same level as principles such as democracy, the rule of law and
20
Klabbers, above n 12, 72.
21
Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and
Climate Change [2011] ECR I-1133, para 101 (ATAA).
22
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C 326/13 (TEU ), Art 21(1); Case
C-366/10, ATAA [2011] ECR I-1133, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, para 43.
23
TEU Art 21(1).
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human rights and fundamental freedoms. It also states that the EUmust `promote
multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of
the United Nations' and `promote an international system based on stronger
multilateral cooperation and good global governance'.24 One of the goals of the
EU's external action is to `consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and the principles of international law'.25 This applies not only to `the
Union's external action' but also to `the external aspects of its other policies'.26
It is evident therefore that the respect for international law, particularly with
regard to the UN and the multilateral system of governance, is given a prominent
place within the Treaties. One could argue, however, that these statements
are more of a political nature to guide the EU's external action rather than its
constitutional relationship with international law. However, it is submitted that
the respect for international law as enshrined in the EU Treaties, can have an
effect on the Court's approach to international law issues. The Court should
attempt, as far as it is possible, to avoid divergences between the approach of
the Court and the other EU organs.27 It can view the respect for international
law not as merely a foreign policy goal, but also as a constitutional principle that
can be used to guide the CJEU. Such an overarching approach, founded in EU
constitutional law, may help the Court develop a more consistent and principled
approach when dealing with international law questions.
2.2 International Law and the EU Legal Order
In determining its relationship with international law, the Court can be guided by
the EU Treaties. But can the CJEU also be guided by general international law? It is
accepted that the CJEU can determine its own relationship with international law
because it is a Court within a domestic legal order, one that applies and interprets
EU law in a similar way to other domestic courts. Moreover, as noted above
international law does not dictate the precise method by which it is to be given
effect within the legal orders of its subjects. As Denza states:
International law does not itself prescribe how it should be applied
or enforced at the national level. It asserts its own primacy over
24
TEU Art 21(1) second para, 21(2)(f).
25
TEU Art 21(2)(b) (emphasis added).
26
TEU Art 21(3).
27
See J Wouters, J Odermatt & T Ramopoulos, `Worlds Apart? Comparing the Approaches of the
European Court of Justice and the EU Legislature to International Law', in M Cremona & A
Thies, The European Court of Justice and External Relations: Constitutional Challenges (2014).
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national laws, but without invalidating those laws or intruding into
national legal systems, requiring a result rather than a method of
implementation. National constitutions are therefore free to choose
how they give effect to treaties and to customary international law.28
Yet, the CJEU not only functions as a domestic court, but also as an
international one. It is the judicial organ of a regional organisation established by
treaties according to international law. This way the CJEUmay decide to develop
an approach to international law that recognises and acknowledges the fact that
it is an international legal body. This approach does not contradict the case law,
beginning with Van Gend en Loos,29 which asserts that international law is not
determinative in applying and interpreting the EU Treaties, since EU Member
States have developed `a new legal order of international law'.30 According to this
approach, the CJEU would still be capable of determining how international law
is given effect in the EU legal order. However, when choosing between adopting
a sovereigntist or an internationalist approach to an issue, the EU's nature as an
international organisation should lead to adopting the latter. This is because the
CJEU is more than a domestic court and its judgments have a wider effect on the
development of international law generally. International law scholarship views
the CJEU as an influential judicial body in the development of international law:
Clearly decisions of judicial organs, such as the International Court
of Justice and the Court of Justice of the EuropeanUnion, contribute
to the development of the law of treaties including principles of
interpretation as well as general international law. The specialized
function of such bodies may naturally limit their contribution to the
latter.31
Such an approach seems to be in line with the EU founding treaties, which
proclaim the EU to be an international organisation founded on principles in-
cluding the respect for international law. It would also help remove contradic-
tions between the EU's internationalist rhetoric, which promotes and embraces
international law, and its more sovereigntist jurisprudence, which sometimes
28
E Denza, `The Relationship between International and National Law', in M Evans (ed) Interna-
tional Law (3
rd
edn, 2010) 411.
29
Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 (Van Gend
en Loos).
30
Ibid, para 12.
31
J Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8
th
edn, 2012) 194.
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views international law as a threat to the integrity and autonomy of the EU legal
order. The Court should see itself as something more than a domestic court, i.e.
also one that contributes to the development of international law.
3 International Law before the CJEU: Multiple
Approaches
The previous section argued that the Court is free to decide its relationship
with international law but that it should be guided by the EU Treaties and by
its nature as an international court. The CJEU is very much still in a process
of shaping the contours of its relationship with international law. As the EU
becomes ever more active on the international stage, the interactions between the
EU and international legal orders have becomemore common andmore complex.
There is a tendency, however, for international lawyers to attach significance to
landmark cases such as Kadi and Mox Plant and to view the CJEU's sovereigntist
approach as a threat to the universal nature of the international legal order.
However, it is argued that these cases are not broadly indicative of an approach
that is developing in the case law.
One of the reasons why a one-dimensional narrative that describes the
`openness' of the Court to international law is inadequate is that the Court
confronts international law issues in a variety of circumstances. Its approach to
international law issues depends often on the function or role that the Court is
playing. Much of the literature on the CJEU's relationship with international
law examines the issue of how international law is given direct effect within
the EU legal order. But before the Court can determine what effect to give to
international law principles, it first must determine (i) whether the rule invoked
is indeed a source of international law, and (ii) whether it is binding upon the
Union.
On the first question, the test is usually straightforward since in many cases
the rule being invoked is enshrined in a treaty. However, the issue is more
complex when rules of customary international law are being invoked. The
Court has given little guidance regarding how it determines the existence of
a customary rule. In Hungary v Slovakia, the Court relied in part on rules of
customary international law but did not elaborate on how it identifies these
rules.32 In ATAA, the Court gives a little more insight. It noted, for example,
that the customary law principles being relied upon are enshrined in Article 1
32
Case C-364/10,Hungary v Slovak Republic [2012] nyr, para 46 (Hungary v Slovakia): `[O]n the basis
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of the Chicago Convention,33 Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas,34 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,35 and it
referred also to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and the
Permanent Court of International Justice.36
The second issue is whether the norm invoked is binding upon the Union.
Again, in cases of treaties to which the EU is a party, the answer is generally
straightforward. In some cases, the CJEU may be asked to apply a treaty to
which the EU is not a party but all the EU Member States are. The Court has
found that the treaty obligations of the Member State can be transferred to the
EU via the theory of `functional succession'. However, the CJEU has been highly
reluctant to find that such a succession has taken place, limiting it to instances
where there has been a full transfer of powers to the EU level.37 In other cases,
the principle invoked may not be binding upon the Union but may nevertheless
represent international `soft law'. The Court may, for example, invoke a norm
that is developed at the international level but is not strictly binding. It has
done so regarding decisions of international bodies which, although not having
binding legal effect, may nevertheless be persuasive in the Court's reasoning.38
There is a proliferation of international norms including guidelines, standards,
best practices, and decisions of international bodies. The Court has not yet
developed a consistent approach in decidingwhat effect to give these non-binding
instruments in the EU legal order.
In many cases the Court will determine whether a rule of international law
that is binding upon the Union should be given legal effect in the EU legal order.
Much of the literature examining theCJEU's approach to international law relates
to this very issue. The issue of direct effect:
goes to the heart of the constitutional architecture of the EUwhere a
balance is to be found between openness to international law, legal
of customary rules of general international law […] the Head of State enjoys a particular status
in international relations which entails, inter alia, privileges and immunities'.
33
Case C-366/10, ATAA [2011] ECR I-1133, para 104.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
See J Odermatt, `Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary
of State for Energy and Climate Change' (2013) 20 Columbia JEL 143.
38
See J Wouters & J Odermatt, `Norms Emanating from International Bodies and Their Role in the
Legal Order of the European Union', in R A Wessel & S Blockmans (eds), Between Autonomy and
Dependence: The EU Legal Order under the Influence of International Organisations (2012) 47.
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certainty, and compliance with international obligations assumed
by the EU, and the integrity of the constitutional principles which
define its identity.39
Although the Court has determined that international law, including both
treaty and customary international law,40 is binding upon the Union from the
moment it enters into force,41 it has established certain rules to determine the
circumstances under which rules of international law may be given effect. The
Court acknowledges that international law applies to the EU but it is much
more restrictive when it comes to actually giving it legal effect in specific
cases. In cases where international law is used to challenge the validity of EU
legislation, for example, the Court has developed strict criteria to determine
whether international law may be used as a basis for review. The Court must
determine whether a treaty is directly applicable and directly effective. It first
looks at the `nature and broad logic' of the treaty `in particular [...] its aim,
preamble and terms'42 to determine whether it precludes it from being used as a
standard of review. It then turns to whether the norm invoked is `unconditional
and sufficiently precise' in order for it be used to challenge the validity of the EU
act.43
The Court has a well-developed line of case law dealing with the direct
effect of international treaties in the EU legal order.44 It has also begun to
develop an approach towards the direct effect of customary international law.45
Yet, the Court's relationship with international law goes beyond direct effect.
For instance, the Court has turned to international law as a tool in treaty
interpretation. It may, for instance, employ principles of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT ) or look towards international law
instruments in order to find the meaning of a certain term. When using it as a
tool, the Court seems to be much more willing to deal with international law.
39
Martines, above n 10, 131–2.
40
Case C-162/96, A Racke GmbH & Co v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655, para 52 (Racke).
41
Case C 533/08, TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG [2010] ECR I-4107, para 60.
42
Case C-308/06, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and others v
Secretary of State for Transport [2008] ECR I-4057, para 54 (Intertanko).
43
Case C-366/10, ATAA [2011] ECR I-1133, para 74.
44
K Lenaerts, `Direct Applicability and Direct Effect of International Law in the EU Legal Order',
in I Govaere, E Lannon, P Van Elsuwege & S Adam (eds), The European Union in the World: Essays
in Honour of Marc Maresceau (2014) 45.
45
Case C-366/10, ATAA [2011] ECR I-1133.
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Even where a treaty is not binding on the EU or is found not to have direct
effect, the Court has noted that it may nevertheless be bound to interpret EU
law `in the light of' international law. The Court has acknowledged the principle
of `consistent interpretation', which stems in part from the EU's duty to respect
international agreements under Article 216(2) TFEU. It has been suggested that
the application of this principle would be `a useful means for the removal of
divergences between two or more norms without resorting to the modification
of those norms through the legislative process'.46 The precise scope of this duty
remains unclear, and there are only few instances of the Court applying the
doctrine of consistent interpretation in practice. Moreover, although the CJEU
has employed international law as a tool for interpretation, the CJEU retains the
prerogative to give an autonomous, `European' meaning to a certain term.
The CJEU's relationship with international law therefore involves much
more than the issue of direct effect. Focusing on this issuemay give an unbalanced
view of the Court's approach since it is in this field that the Court applies the
most `sovereigntist' approach. In other situations, the Court has readily invoked
international law norms as part of its reasoning. The next section turns to some
recent cases where the Court has dealt with international law issues.
3.1 Air Transport Association of America (ATAA)
The case of Air Transport Association of America (ATAA) is helpful in demonstrating
the CJEU's relationship within international law. It is not a ground-breaking
case in terms of establishing new legal rules, but it does go a long way to clarify
certain concepts regarding the way international law is dealt with by the CJEU.
The case involves a challenge to a 2008 Directive that applied the EU's emission
trading scheme (ETS) to aviation.47 Under the scheme, non-EU airlines would be
subject to the EU's carbon trading scheme if they landed in or took off from an
airport in the territory of an EUMember State. The Directive was challenged on
the basis that it violated numerous international law principles established under
46
A Alì, `Some Reflections on the Principle of Consistent Interpretation Through the Case Law of
the European Court of Justice International Courts and the Development of International Law',
in N Boschiero, T Scovazzi, C Pitea & C Ragni (eds), International Courts and the Development of
International Law: Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves (2013) 882.
47
Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 Amending
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission
Allowance Trading within the Community [2008] OJ 2009 L 8/3.
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the Chicago Convention,48 the Open Skies Agreement,49 the Kyoto Protocol,50
as well as rules of customary international law. The ETS was established, in
part, to implement the EU's obligations under the Kyoto Protocol in order
to `promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and
economically efficient manner'.51 However, it was argued that the ETS applied
`extra-territorially' since it applied to the entire flight, not only to the part over EU
airspace. It was also challenged on the basis of being a `unilateral' measure, since
the EU had taken the step without similar market-based mechanisms established
at the international level, such as through ICAO. The third main argument was
that the Directive breached international agreements liberalising the aviation
industry, since it constituted a tax or charge on airlines.
The Court examined these issues in a methodical fashion, observing each
international agreement in turn to seewhether it was binding upon theUnion and
whether it could be used as a basis of review of EU acts. Regarding the Chicago
Convention, the Court found that it was not binding upon the Union since the
EU was not a party to the Convention, although all EUMember States were. The
Court refused to apply the principle of functional succession to the convention
since it could not be established that `a full transfer of the powers previously
exercised by the Member States to the Community'52 had been established. Both
the Kyoto Protocol and theOpen Skies Agreementwere found to be binding upon
the Union.
In line with its case law on direct effect, the Court examined whether the
`nature and the broad logic' of the treaties in question precluded them from
being used to challenge EU legislation. In addition, the Court examined whether
the specific provisions of these treaties `appear, as regards their content, to be
unconditional and sufficiently precise so as to confer on persons subject to
European Union law the right to rely thereon in legal proceedings in order to
contest the legality of an act of European Union law'.53 With regard to the
Kyoto Protocol, the Court found that it could not be considered as unconditional
48
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295 (Chicago Conven-
tion).
49
US–EU Air Transport Agreement, 30 April 2007, 46 ILM 470.
50
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December
1997, 2303 UNTS 148 (Kyoto Protocol).
51
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 Establishing a
Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Council
Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ 2003 L 275/32.
52
Case C-308/06, Intertanko [2008] ECR I-4057, para 49 (emphasis added).
53
Case C-366/10, ATAA [2011] ECR I-1133, para 74.
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and sufficiently precise so as to confer on individuals the right to rely on it in
order to contest the validity of the ETS Directive. This was due to the fact that
Kyoto allows for `a certain degree of flexibility in the implementation of their
commitments'.54 Regarding the Open Skies agreement, the Court found that the
nature and broad logic of the agreement did not preclude it from being used to
assess the validity of the contested Directive.55 It then turned to the language
of the agreement to determine whether the provisions were `unconditional and
sufficiently precise' so as to allow for review.
The Court applies a different approach, however, where customary interna-
tional law is concerned. In the case at hand, it stated that a principle of customary
international law may be relied upon `in so far as […] those principles are capa-
ble of calling into question the competence of the European Union to adopt that
act'.56 The second part of the test is that the EU act `is liable to affect rights which
the individual derives from European Union law or to create obligations under
European Union law in his regard'.57 The Court found that, while the principles
of customary international law create obligations between States, in the present
case the principles can also be relied upon by individuals to examine the validity
of the Directive.58 However, the Court limits its judicial review to the question
whether `in adopting the act in question, the institutions of the European Union
mademanifest errors of assessment concerning the conditions for applying those
principles'.59 The Court therefore applies a substantially different test regarding
direct effect depending on whether customary law or treaty law is invoked. This
is because, according to the CJEU, customary international law `does not have the
same degree of precision as a provision of an international agreement'.60
The Court deals with international law in a straightforward, even rigid
manner. The effect of the case is that despite its apparent openness towards
international law, the CJEU applies rather restrictive rules to determine whether
international law may be used to challenge EU legislation. The case received
criticism, especially from air and space lawyers from outside the EU. It was
54
Ibid, para 75.
55
Ibid, paras 79–84.
56
Ibid, para 107. The Court cited the following case law supporting this test: Joined Cases 89/85,
104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and 125/85 to 129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission
[1988] ECR 5193, paras 14–8; Case C-405/92Mondiet [1993] ECR I-6133, paras 11–6.
57
Case C-366/10, ATAA [2011] ECR I-1133, para 107.
58
Ibid, para 109.
59
Ibid, para 110.
60
Ibid.
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described as an example of the `growing isolationism of the Court's case law'.61
Parts of the judgment have been described as `rather short and cryptic'62 using
`fragile reasoning'63 without a thorough engagement with the international legal
issues at play. With regard to the non-applicability of the Chicago Convention,
some commentators found it perplexing that `the EU's highest court felt at liberty
to discard international aviation law's foundational treaty as irrelevant to the
most vexed international aviation dispute in recent memory'.64 It also shows that
the CJEU is not open to direct effect of international treaties unless they involve
rights capable of being relied upon by individuals. In effect, this reduces direct
effect of international agreements to trade agreements, association agreements,
as well as partnership and cooperation agreements entered into by the Union.
It precludes a range of multilateral agreements from being used as a standard of
review since they are usually couched in broad terms giving the parties greater
room to implement the agreement.
TheATAA case demonstrates theCJEU'smore rigid approach to international
law. It begins in an international law-friendly tone: `Under Article 3(5) TEU, the
European Union is to contribute to the strict observance and the development
of international law. Consequently, when it adopts an act, it is bound to observe
international law in its entirety'.65 However, it progressively developed rules that
limit the circumstances where international law may be given effect. Moreover,
although the Court is open in principle to interpreting EU law `in the light of'
international law, in this case the Court did not endeavour to apply the principle
of consistent interpretation. It is a prime example of the CJEU in its role as a
domestic court, limiting the effect of international lawwhen it is used to challenge
EU acts.
61
B Mayer, `Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State
for Energy and Climate Change' (2012) 49 CMLR 1135.
62
E Denza, `International Aviation and the EU Carbon Trading Scheme: Comment on the Air
Transport Association of America Case' (2102) 7 European LR 323.
63
Mayer, above n 61, 1139.
64
B F Havel & J Q Mulligan, `The Triumph of Politics: Reflections on the Judgment of the Court
of Justice of the European Union Validating the Inclusion of Non-EU Airlines in the Emissions
Trading Scheme' (2012) 37 Air & Space L 10.
65
Case C-366/10, ATAA [2011] ECR I-1133, para 101.
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3.2 Brita
The Brita case has been presented as a case where the CJEU adopted a more
international law friendly attitude.66 Brita, a German company, imported drink
makers for sparkling water, accessories and syrups, from an Israeli supplier, Soda
Club Ltd. The German authorities refused to give preferential treatment to Brita
on the grounds that it could not be established conclusively that the imported
goods fell within the scope of the EC–Israel Association Agreement. This is
because Brita had stated that the goods' country of originwas Israel, although they
were manufactured in Mishor Adumin in the West Bank, East of Jerusalem. The
question was whether the goods should have been given preferential treatment
in any event, since they would have fallen under the EC–Israel Association
Agreement or EC–PLO Association Agreement.
The Court made use of rules laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties to the extent that they represent customary international law,
which is binding on the EuropeanUnion. The CJEU held that `the rules laid down
in the Vienna Convention apply to an agreement concluded between a state and
an international organisation […] in so far as the rules are an expression of general
international customary law'.67 One of these rules that the Court sought recourse
to was the general international law principle of the relative effect of treaties,
according to which treaties do not impose any obligations or confer any rights on
third states (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt). The Court therefore interpreted
Article 83 of the EC–Israel Association Agreement, which defines the territorial
scope of that agreement, in a manner that is consistent with that principle of
international law. The CJEU considered that if it were to interpret Article 83
in a way that the Israeli customs authorities enjoy competence in respect of
products originating in the West Bank, this would be tantamount to imposing
on the Palestinian customs authorities an obligation to refrain from exercising
the competence conferred upon them by virtue of the EC–PLO Protocol. Such
an interpretation, the Court found, would create an obligation for a third party
without its consent, and would thus be contrary to the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec
prosunt principle.
The case can be seen as another example of the CJEU applying international
law, as Klabbers states, `in ways which are all but unrecognizable to the interna-
tional lawyer'.68 Klabbers was referring in that instance to the way in which the
66
C-386/08, Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen [2010] ECR I-1289, para 41 (Brita).
67
C-386/08, Brita [2010] ECR I-1289, para 41.
68
Klabbers, above n 12, 72.
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CJEU applied the rebus sic stantibus rule in the Racke case.69 Similarly in Brita, the
CJEU applied the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle in order to interpret
the treaty, arguably in a way that would be peculiar to some international lawyers.
Although the Court had employed the 1969 VCLT in previous case law, this had
involved Article 31 thereof which are the rules pertaining to the general rules of
treaty interpretation.70 Article 34 VCLT, however, is not a rule of treaty interpre-
tation but a principle that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for
a third State without its consent. Hence, although the CJEU applied international
law in this case, it arguably did so in a somewhat novel way.
Moreover, the case is silent on the wider international law context of the
case. TheOpinion of the Advocate General makes references to thewider context
of the Israel–Palestine dispute, including references to United Nations Security
Council Resolution 242,71 which calls upon Israel to withdraw from the occupied
territories. The judgment, however, makes little reference to the wider context of
the dispute. The Court is able to avoid discussion of this wider context, however,
by treating the case very much similar to a standard customs cooperation case.
Yet, the case is more than a straightforward customs case and the Court is faced
with delicate issues of international law. While the case may be presented as one
where the Court shows an open attitude to international law, it is in reality one
where the CJEU has made use of international law as a tool in its reasoning.
International law was not being used to challenge an act of the EU but to help
resolve a dispute involving EU law.
3.3 Hungary v Slovakia
The recent Hungary v Slovakia72 case can be seen as an example of the Court
acting as more of an `international court'. The case relates to a diplomatic
incident between Hungary and Slovakia in which the President of Hungary,
Mr László Sólyom was scheduled to go to the Slovak town of Komárno in
order to inaugurate a statue of Saint Stephen, the founder and first king
of Hungary. Slovakian authorities refused to allow entry of the Hungarian
President, considering the visit to be a provocation. Hungarian authorities argued
that the measure that had prohibited Mr Sólyom from entering Slovak territory
69
Case C-162/96, Racke [1998] ECR I-3655.
70
See P J Kuijper, `Case C-386/08, Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen Judgment of the
European Court of Justice of 25 February 2010' (2010) 37 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 241.
71
SC Res 242, 22 November 1967.
72
Case C-364/10, Hungary v Slovak Republic [2012] nyr.
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was in breach of EU law. Hungary instituted proceedings against Slovakia under
the procedure in Art 259 TFEU.73 This was only the fourth time a Member State
had made use of this procedure.
The Court held that as a Hungarian national Mr Sólyom enjoys European
citizenship and the rights associated with it including the right tomove and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States as set out in Art 21 TFEU.74
However, the status of a Head of State in international law constitutes a limitation
on the application of the Union's right of free movement. It found that EU
law does not oblige Slovakia to grant access to its territory to the President of
Hungary. In doing so, it examined principles of customary international relating
to visits by Heads of State.
In deciding how to resolve the diplomatic row, the Court had a number
of options. The first option would be to stress the primacy of EU law and to
find that the incident can be solved with reference solely to the EU law of free
movement of persons. The other option was to find that EU law does not apply
in this case and therefore look to the application of international law, especially
the international law of diplomatic relations. In effect, the second option would
mean the restriction of certain rights of EU nationals, in this case the President of
Hungary, based on international law. Rather, the CJEU sought to follow a third
option, to interpret relevant EU law `in the light of' international law.
The case can be seen as another example of the CJEU being `open' to interna-
tional law. However, the way in which the Court engages with international law
questions is again novel. While it referred to customary international law regard-
ing the status of Heads of State, it did not go on to identify what the content of
these rules actually were. Interestingly, the Court did not look towards the case
law of other regional or international courts that had faced similar issues, such as
the ICJ's judgment in the Arrest Warrant case.75 The Court employs international
law, but in a way that many international lawyers may find puzzling.
The case has also been presented as a move away from the strictly `dualist'
reasoning that underpinned the Kadi judgment: `While the scope of Hungary
73
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47
(TFEU ) Art 259: `AMember State which considers that anotherMember State has failed to fulfill
an obligation under the Treaties may bring thematter before the Court of Justice of the European
Union'.
74
TFEU Art 21: `Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the
Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect'.
75
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), ICJ Reports 2002 p 3.
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is unclear and the case may prove to be a context specific exception to the
ECJ's otherwise dualist approach, it might instead suggest a broader role for
international law within the EU than it had previously been thought'.76 One
could imagine the Court employing Kadi style reasoning to assert the primacy
of rules of free movement in the same way it stressed the primacy of fundamental
rights. Rather, the Court's judgment should be seen as an astute attempt to avoid
a clash between EU and international law as in Kadi. It continued to assert the
fundamental character of citizenship in EU law but interpreted it with reference
to applicable customary international law. One analysis of the judgment states
that `[a]s the European Union is also part of the greater international community,
the CJEU recognised the precedence of international law over EU law, because
international law is considered as part of the legal order of the EU and therefore is
binding for all institutions'.77 But the Court did not really find that international
law takes precedence over EU law, or that EU law did not apply to the situation.
The Court asserted that EU law continues to apply but it should be read in the
light of applicable international law rules. Again, international law is not being
used to challenge an EU act but is used by the Court to resolve a dispute between
EU Member States.
3.4 Diakité
To what extent should the CJEU interpret EU legislation in conformity with
international law? This was one of the questions that was examined in the
recent Diakité case.78 The key question in this case was whether the definition of
`internal armed conflict' is to be based on the criteria established by international
humanitarian law or whether it can be given a separate, autonomous meaning
for the purposes of European law. Specifically, the Court was asked to interpret
the term `internal armed conflict' used in Article 15(c) of Directive 2004/83/EC,
which sets out minimum standards for granting refugee status or subsidiary
protection status.79 The referring Court, the BelgianConseil d'État, askedwhether
76
`Case C-364/10, Hungary v Slovak Republic, 2012 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS' (2013) 126 Harvard LR
2425, 2430.
77
MFilippin `A Change for Future Intra-European Diplomatic Relations? Case C-364/10 Hungary
v Slovakia, Judgment of 16 October 2012, not yet reported' (2013) 20Maastricht JECL 120, 126.
78
Case C-285/12, Aboubacar Diakité v Commissaire Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides [2014] nyr
(Diakité).
79
Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status
of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international
protection and the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ L 304/12.
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the terms should be defined according to international humanitarian law, in
particular with reference to Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949.
In his Opinion,80 Advocate General Mengozzi referred to Article 3(5) TEU,
which states that the EU shall contribute to the `strict observance and the
development of international law strict observance and the development of
international law'.81 Based on this article, as well as relevant case law, it was
noted that EU measures should be interpreted in the light of relevant rules of
international law. This includes not only treaties binding upon the Union, but
also customary international law. However, he noted that the term `internal
armed conflict' in the Directive is used for a different purpose than that of
`non-international armed conflict' in IHL. The Court followed this reasoning,
stating that the terms relate to two different fields of law, both of which have
different aims and involve different protection regimes.82
Since the Directive itself does not define the term `internal armed conflict',
the Court interpreted the term according to its usual meaning in everyday
language, taking into account the purposes of the legislation.83 The Court
then defined the term `internal armed conflict' as `a situation in which a State's
armed forces confront one or more armed groups or in which two or more
armed groups confront each other'.84 Under international humanitarian law,
specifically Common Article 3, for hostilities to be considered as `a conflict of
a non-international character' they must meet specific criteria. The hostilities
must have reached a certain threshold of intensity, setting them apart from
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or banditry, and the hostilities must involve
non-governmental forces that have some kind of organised command structure.
The Court therefore established a much broader definition of the term for the
purposes of EU law. The Court justifies the separate definitions on the basis that
international humanitarian law and the relevant EU Directive were designed for
different purposes and spheres of application.
This can be viewed as the CJEU finding an autonomous, `European' meaning
to a term that is already defined by international law, and an example of
the `fragmentation' of international law. In this way, it is reminiscent of the
divergence between the International Court of Justice and the Appeals Chamber
80
Case C-285/12, Diakité [2014] nyr, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi.
81
TEU Art 3(5).
82
Case C-285/12, Diakité [2014] nyr, para 24.
83
Ibid, para 27.
84
Ibid, para 28.
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of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia concerning
the test to determine the nature of an armed conflict. The ICTY Appeals
Chamber in applying an `overall control' test, seemed to deviate from the `effective
control' test applied by the ICJ in the Nicaragua judgment.85 However, this
apparent divergence can be explained by the fact that the ICJ and ICTY Appeals
Chamber were applying these tests in different legal contexts. In Tadic, the
Appeals Chamber was determining whether or not an armed conflict exists for
the purpose of determining whether the grave breaches system would apply.86
In Nicaragua, however, the ICJ was primarily concerned with the topic of state
responsibility, not individual criminal law. In the Bosnia Genocide case, the ICJ
rejected the notion that a single test had to apply to both bodies of law:
[T]he degree and nature of a State's involvement in an armed conflict
on another State's territory which is required for the conflict to be
characterized as international, can very well, and without logical
inconsistency, differ from the degree and nature of involvement
required to give rise to that State's responsibility for a specific act
committed in the course of the conflict.87
Likewise, the definition of internal armed conflict for the purposes of EU
legislation can require a lower level of intensity and organisation of armed groups
than that required by IHL.
Although the CJEU applied a different definition in this case, its approach
in Diakité is not antagonistic towards international law. The situation would
be different, however, if the EU Directive had intended to implement an
international legal obligation. In such a case, it is likely that the Court would
be more inclined to apply the definition used at the international level. However,
this stems from an obligation under EU law, especially Article 3(5) TEU and not
out of respect for international law per se.
85
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US), ICJ Reports 1986 p
14, 65.
86
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (aka `Dule'), Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-A, 1999, 1.
87
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ Reports 2007 p 43, 210.
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4 Conclusion: International or Domestic Court?
The case of Van Gend en Loos is often cited as the point where the Court marked
the beginning of its liberation from international law when it declared that `the
Community constitutes a new legal order of international law'.88 The story is that
the EU, founded by international instruments, soon developed its own legal order
and `broke free' from international law: `[t]he European treaties have, of course,
been concluded according to the rules of international law. But the legal order
which was erected soon emancipated from its origins'.89 While international law
has little relevance in interpreting and applying the EU treaties, the EU verymuch
remains bound by international law in its relationship with the outside world.
The idea is that the EU legal order `broken free' from international law is only
one part of a much more complex reality. International law still applies to the EU
as an international actor. The CJEU still employs international law in its judicial
reasoning and seeks to apply EU law in the light of international law.
Much of the literature on the CJEU's relationship with international law has
focused on the landmark Kadi judgment. The judgment was criticised by many
international lawyers, who argued that it was an example of the CJEU turning
towards a more `dualist' approach:
The ECJ's reasoning was robustly dualist, emphasizing repeatedly
the separateness and autonomy of the EC from other legal systems
and from the international legal order more generally, and the
priority to be given to the EC's own fundamental rules. A related and
significant feature was the lack of direct engagement by the Court
with the nature and significance of the international rules at issue in
the case, or with other relevant sources of international law.90
It is true that the judgment seems to lack a thorough engagement with
international law issues. The Charter of the United Nations is viewed as nothing
more than a mere international agreement, and the Court did not fully discuss
the application of Art 109 of the Charter, which sets out the supremacy of
88
Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.
89
K-M Meessen, `The Application of Public International Law Within Community Law' (1976) 13
CMLR 485, 485.
90
G de Búrca, `The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi' (2010)
51 Harvard ILJ 1, 23.
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Charter obligations in the event of conflict.91 This one case, however, cannot
be considered representative of the CJEU's approach towards international law
in general. It is a rather extreme case where the CJEU acted `as any other
``constitutional court of a municipal legal order'''.92 The case has been discussed
in depth elsewhere from numerous angles. The point to be made here is that in
Kadi the Court felt the need to safeguard its autonomy from the international legal
order, something that was all the more important since it involved fundamental
human rights norms enshrined in EU primary law. In doing so, the Court was not
placing EU law above international law, nor was it asserting the separateness of
the EU legal order from international law. By focusing on this case, international
lawyers may view the CJEU adopting a sovereignist approach, one which poses
a serious challenge to the integrity of the international legal order and the UN
system.
Yet, there are still instances where the Court's approach is that of an interna-
tional court, one which is open to international law influences in resolving legal
disputes. Recent cases such as Diakité or Hungary v Slovakia are examples of the
Court playing this role. The Court is after all a court of a regional international
organisation and its judgments are highly influential in the development of inter-
national law. Some may assume that this means that the Court should be more
open towards international law since international law is in the DNA of the EU.
Yet, the Court's approach can be viewed as an outcome of the constitutionalisa-
tion of both the EU and the international legal orders. The Court is still trying
to find a balance between protecting the autonomy of its own legal order and the
openness towards international law that is enshrined in the EU Treaties. Rather
than view the CJEU's approach to international law as `open' or `closed', it should
be understood as involving multiple relationships depending on the way in which
international law norms come before the Court.
91
Charter of the United Nations, Art 109 (UN Charter): `In the event of a conflict between
the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail'.
92
V Fikfak, `Kadi and the Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the International
Legal Order' (2013) 15 CYELS 21.
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